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This paper responds to the question: Do physicians have an ethical obligation to care for
patients with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)? First, the social and political
milieu in which this question arises is sampled. Here physicians aswell as othermembers ofthe
community are found declaring an unwillingness to be exposed to people with AIDS. Next,
laws, regulations, ethical codes and principles, and the history of the practice of medicine are
examined, and the literature as it pertains to these areas is reviewed. The obligation to care for
patients with AIDS, however, cannot be located in an orientation to morality defined in rules
and codes and an appeal to legalistic fairness.
By turning to the orientation to morality that emerges naturally from connection and is
defined in caring, the physicians' ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS is found.
Through an exploration ofthe writings ofmodern medical ethicists, it is clear that the purpose
of the practice of medicine is healing, which can only be accomplished in relationship to the
patient. It is in relationship to patients that the physician has the opportunity for self-
realization. In fact, the physician is physician in relationship to patients and only to the extent
that heorshe actsvirtuouslybybeingmorallyresponsible forand to thosepatients. Not to do so
diminishes the physician's ethical ideal, a vision of the physician as good physician, which has
consequences for the physician's capacity to care and for the practice ofmedicine.
INTRODUCTION
Little did anyone know in 1981, when reports of the first cases of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) began to trickle in, that the decadewould come
to represent a time ofmajor conflict and challenge for the practice ofmedicine. That
challenge would encompass the realm ofscience and technology in its most intimate
interface with humanity. There is no doubt that many physicians met the challenge
with strength and dignity and courage. There was, however, also turmoil, confusion,
and fear that resulted in some physicians declaring what to many was unthinkable,
that they would not care for patients with the disease known as AIDS. There
followed an intense debate in the media and in the medical literature, as well as in
the halls of hospitals and medical schools across the country, that centered on the
following question: Do physicians have an ethical obligation to care forpatientswith
AIDS?
No one seems to recall similar questions having been open to such intense query:
207
Abbreviations: AIDS: acquired immunodeficiency syndrome AMA: American Medical Association
ARC: AIDS-related complex AZT: zidovudine CDC: Centers for Disease Control GROP: get rid of
patients HIV: human immunodeficiency virus HMO: health maintenance organization TMA: Texas
Medical Association
Copyright © 1991 by The Yale Journal ofBiology and Medicine, Inc.
All rights ofreproduction in any form reserved.NANCY ROCKMORE ANGOFF
Do physicians have an ethical obligation to care for patients with tuberculosis? Do
physicians have an ethical obligation to care for patients with polio? An explanation
commonly offered is that, before antimicrobials, physicians knowingly became
physicians in the face ofpersonal risk, and, after antimicrobials, physicians compla-
cently grew to expect negligible personal risk. AIDS, however, ". . . ruptured this
psychological aura of invulnerability" [1]. Of course, the situation is more complex.
AIDS presents not only fear of a potentially deadly virus, but one with strong
emotional connotations, built around the vehicles oftransmission ofthevirus, blood
and semen; the mode of transmission of the virus, piercing needles and sexual
intercourse; and the kinds ofpeople we think are more apt to transmit it, homosexu-
als and intravenous drug abusers.
Other explanations for physicians' reluctance at this time have been offered as
well. Loewy states, "No longer is the society in which the physician functions and in
which are his/her roots the 'tight little island' of yesteryear. In many respects it is
more egocentric, more hedonistic, more pampered and spoiled, less community
oriented and more dedicated to the self.... Our media and our propaganda extol
'rugged individualism' and often demean social action" [2].
Each medical student and physician must come to termswith strongfeelings about
this disease and about caring for patients with this disease. As one physician put it,
"At some point in ourprofessional lives each ofusworks out a personalbargainwith
society. My own bargain renders the evil, pain, and inconvenience of caring for
patients with AIDS as much a part of my job as the care of any other critically ill
patient. Manyofmycolleagues have bargains that statejust the reverse" [3].
This paper responds to the question, do physicians have an ethical obligation to
care forpatientswith AIDS? Itregards the practice ofmedicine as agreatunfinished
tapestry, woven over the years to tell a story, added to by the individual physicians
whose own stories are woven into the larger tapestry, enriched with threads of
commitment, care, and relationship, and dulled with threads of self-interest. It
begins by looking at the social and political milieu in which this question first arises.
It then examineslaws, regulations, ethical codes andprinciples, and the historyofthe
practice of medicine as they pertain to this question. These considerations are
followed by an examination of several modern models of medical ethics. Finally, it
turns to a different orientation to morality for an answer to the question.
AIDS: THE MILIEU
I'vethoughtabout whatI'lldo when the time comesandI'm sosickthatIneed
someone to take care ofme. Idon'tknowwhatI'lldo. Imightnotlive tosee that.
That goes through my mind all the time. Nobody's gonna take care ofyou for
nothing.
A person that's going through it needs someone who's going through it.
Otherwiseyou can'tunderstand. It'slikemyBlack-American Historyteacherwho
was white and said, "I understand. I understand." Well, you don't understand
becauseyou don't understand unlessyou'regoing through ityourself There's no
curefor it. It's differentfromjustbeingsickandgoinghome next week and living
yourlife. This is totallydifferent[4].
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Physicians Refusing to Care
When the first physicians proclaimed their refusal to care for patients with AIDS,
the public and the profession were left to question what it means for physicians to
refuse todowhatthey have been educated and trained todo. Physicians are, afterall,
members ofthe community, and, in refusing to care for patients with AIDS [5], they
are both echoing the voices of turmoil, confusion, and fear of that community and
adding to them.
OnJuly 11, 1987, an article onthe front page ofTheNew York Times stated thatDr.
Terence M. Schmahl, chiefofthe department ofthoracic and cardiovascular surgery
at St. Luke's Hospital in Milwaukee, was ". . . one ofavery small butvisible number
of medical practitioners around the country who are refusing to care for carriers of
the AIDS virus" [6]. The article quoted Dr. Schmahl as saying, "'I've got to be
selfish.... I've got to think about myself; I've got to think about my family. That
responsibility is greater than to the patient' " [6]. Dr. Schmahl's standwas attributed
to two factors; one was fear of contracting an incurable contagious disease and the
other was discrimination against male homosexuals, who made up the largest single
group ofpeople at risk ofcontagion.
The public stand taken by Dr. Schmahl was also taken by Dr. Bruce Wilbur, a
private cardiovascular surgeon in Mountainview, California, who stated, "'They
[health care workers] don't like having to work on people with a fatal and possibly
communicable disease.... I know I don't.... I did my time. I had a nine-year
residency and took care of everything bad you could imagine. I put myself at risk, I
had hepatitis. I don't want tobe forced to do it anymore' " [7].
Prager states, "Although the number of doctors who have publicly announced
their boycott of AIDS patients is small, almost certainly there is a much larger
number who sympathize with their more vocal colleagues and will follow in their
footsteps" [8]. Along with these well-publicized declarations of two established
physicians, there have been reports ofother examples ofphysicians' attitudes as they
relate to caring for patients withAIDS [9].
Link et al. studied medical and pediatric interns and residents in four New York
City house staff training programs. They found that ". . . 25 per cent of all house
officers surveyed would not continue to care for AIDS patients ifgiven a choice....
Furthermore, 36 per cent ofmedical and 19 per cent of pediatric residents believed
their AIDS experience made them less likely to care for AIDS patients in their
future" [10]. Most interesting is the finding that "Twenty-four per cent ofthe house
officers believed that refusing to care forAIDS patients was not unethical" [10].
Zugerinterned in 1981 atNewYorkCity's Bellevue Hospital. She describes covert
refusal ofhouse staffto care for patients with AIDS: "The AIDS patient who never
quite gets visited on morning rounds 'because there's nothing new to say,' 'because
all the students upsethim,'"because the internwill comebackand talktohim later' is
all too familiar. So is the thin, feverish young man who waits somewhat longer than
his turn in the emergency room" [3].
FearofInfection
There are many reasons posited for physicians behaving this way, two of which
have alreadybeenmentioned: fear and discrimination. Drs. Schmahl andWilburcite
fear ofgetting AIDS as their major motivation in refusing to care for these patients.
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Other physicians, as well, confess to worrying about the risks and uncertainties
involved in contracting this virus [11]. One study of56 medical house officers at San
Francisco General Hospital found that 91 percent ". . . were at least 'mildly anxious'
about caring for AIDS patients.. ." [12]. That study reports that it was not
uncommon for house officers to experience unpleasant dreams or nightmares about
AIDS. Furthermore, some physicians believe that what is known about human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) cannot be known with certainty. It has been reported
that several Florida physicians have contended that "No one, based on current
medical evidence, can be sure ofhow HIV is transmitted . . . " [13].
What is known about the risk to health care workers of acquiring AIDS? Allen
states, "Although isolated cases of HIV infection in health care personnel have
created a high level of anxiety about the risk of treating such patients, the actual
probability of contracting infection is extremely small" [14]. The major route of
infection in health care workers has been accidental needle stick. Three health care
workers reportedly became infected after exposure to HIV-positive blood on their
skin or mucous membranes. In each of two studies done by the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) of health care workers exposed to HIV, 0.44 percent and 0.54
percent, respectively, were found to be seropositive after exposure. In several other
studies, none of those exposed were found to seroconvert. Allen places a maximum
risk estimate at one seroconversion per 200 incidents ofexposure [14]. There remain
some factors, however, which may affect this estimate aboutwhich little is known: for
example, the size of the inoculum and co-factors involving the health status of the
recipient. Therefore, there is a definite risk of exposure to infection by this deadly
virus, estimated to be "small," which can be reduced even further by careful
adherence to protective guidelines. Some physicians feel, however, as with winning
the lottery, it does not matter how small the odds are, all that matters is that it can
happen to me. For some physicians, no level ofrisk ofexposure to a deadly disease is
acceptable.
Discrimination
The other motivation mentioned for refusal to care for patients with AIDS is
discrimination. Kemena, a medical student, iswary ofsuggesting that his team spend
more time with James, a young homosexual patient with AIDS, ". . . lest my remarks
be misinterpreted as enthusiasm for this homosexual patient" [15]. Add to discrimi-
nation against homosexuals, discrimination against drug addicts who, for the most
part, are also members of minority groups [16]. "Drug addicts-the other large
category of patients-are notoriously unpopular patients on hospital wards; young
physicians seeking their own equilibrium on the wards are always ready to discourse
on the 'manipulative and demanding addict personality,' the futility oftreating their
'self-inflicted' diseases" [3].
There are other reasons, aswell, forphysicians' reluctance to care forpatientswith
AIDS, including the reality that the victims of this disease are often young, a fact
found disturbing to the (for the most part, also young) house staff, and that they are
beyond the pale of any known medical cure, leading to a sense of impotence on the
part of their caregivers [3]. One health care worker states, "'It's not AIDS itself.
That's not what people are reacting to. There are two main issues: sexuality and
death' " [17]. In other words, in addition to fear of exposure to a deadly virus is the
stigma attached to a disease that may be sexually transmitted [18].
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Thus, victims of AIDS are considered to have transgressed in some unfortunate
and disagreeable way. In addition to the prospect of death, AIDS suggests other
potentially horrible prospects. Sontag says, "In contrast to cancer, understood in a
modern way as a disease incurred by (and revealing of) individuals, AIDS is
understood in a premodern way, as a disease incurred by people both as individuals
and as members of a 'risk group'-that neutral sounding, bureaucratic category
which also revives the archaic idea of a tainted community that illness has judged"
[19].
What is clear is that the reasons for physicians' reluctance to care for patientswith
AIDS are complex and have something to do with the HIV carrier as a "polluting
person." Douglas states, "A polluting person is always in the wrong. He has
developed some wrong condition or simply crossed some line which should not have
been crossed and this displacement unleashes danger for someone" [20]. Physicians
sense and respond to thisdanger. But they are notalone insensing and responding to
this danger-the rest ofthe community has been responding, too.
The Response ofthe Community
In 1987, a Gallup Poll of 1,607 adults interviewed around the United States found
the following: 45 percent agreed with the statement that "Most people with AIDS
have only themselves to blame"; 33 percent said that employers should be able to
dismiss employees with the AIDS virus; and 60 percent agreed with the statement,
"People with the AIDSvirus should be made to carry a card to that effect" [21]. The
idea that people with AIDS should be singled out and identified in some way so that
they could be avoided or separated gained popularity for a time. Columnist William
F. Buckley, Jr., reportedly called for universal screening and tattooing the forearms
and buttocks of anyone positive for HIV [22]. Local health officials in various states
debated when and under what conditions it might be appropriate to isolate AIDS
sufferers from the rest ofsociety, and, since 1985, at least nine states have gone so far
as to amend or pass quarantine laws [23,24]. One report stated, "One sign of the
times is that some people now speak in terms of quarantine, a charged word
conjuring up frightening images of mass roundups and leper colonies [23]. Musto
states, ". . . quarantine is a response not only to the actual mode oftransmission, but
also to a popular demand to establish a boundary between the kind of people so
diseased and the respectable people who hope to remain healthy" [25].
There has been a widely held belief that AIDS is punishment brought on people
for their own immoral behavior. A Vatican spokesman, Archbishop John Foley,
reportedly called the disease a "natural sanction" against immoral behavior [26]. A
writer to the Ann Landers column said the following: "It is my hope that a cure for
AIDS is not found. I also hope that it continues to infect individualswho are sexually
promiscuous and those who share dirty needles while injecting drugs. As long as
people insist on giving this disease to themselveswe should let them do it" [27].
Many people have responded in peculiar and even outrageous ways to the
perceived threat of AIDS. Two male college students kept ". . . an 'AIDS index,' a
one-to-ten scale by which they rate the likelihood of infection of their women
friends" [28]. Duringthe trial ofa manchargedwith assault against awomanwho has
AIDS, the judge ".... ruled that evidence tainted with the blood of an AIDS victim
could not be submitted as exhibits. Instead, photographs of a gun, handcuffs and
clothing will be used.... Maloney found unacceptable the usual method ofpresent-
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ing blood-stained evidence in plastic bags" [29]. A wife tried to sue her bisexual
husband ". . . because she has developed an 'AIDS phobia' due to her husband's
extramarital activities" [30]. Perhaps the most outrageous statement reportedly was
made by Philip Robertson, a Connecticut State Senator, after the passage of a bill to
protect the confidentiality of people tested for AIDS. "'We're spending too much
time protecting the rights of AIDS victims.' Robertson said. 'If someone's carrying
around a deadly disease, I should know. And if I wish to discriminate I should
discriminate' "[31].
One of the most disturbing events arising out of the atmosphere of fear and
ignorance surrounding the AIDS epidemic that has been played out in towns all
across the country is the barring from school of children infected with HIV. In
Tennessee, one boy with hemophilia, who was also positive for HIV, reportedly
".... was forced to ride a school bus alone and was quarantined by himself in a
classroom following an incident inwhich some parents ofclassmates stoned the truck
he was riding in to school, screaming, 'Kill him, kill him'" [32]. In Arcadia, Florida,
three HIV-positive boys with hemophilia were excluded from their school, and
eventually their house was mysteriously burned. To the townspeople, ". . . the enemy
was AIDS, a dark and sinister force that threatened their own children, no matter
how many authorities assured them there was no risk in casual contact among school
children" [33]. One of the town physicians was quoted as saying, "'The parents are
not convinced and can you blame them? Would you let your children playwith a child
with positive HIV? I have advised parents that from what I have read, HIV is not
communicable through casual contact. But parents still fear exposure from the kids
playing together' " [13]. Another local physician concurred: "'I know some parents
have instructed their children not to come into contact with the Ray children....
And that's what I would tell my children' "[13].
Physicians as members of the community are subject to the same fears, rational
and irrational, as the community. But they are also physicians. Is there something
about being physicians that ought to compel them to face their fear squarely and
meet it by doing what they have trained to do, helping to overcome the pain and
suffering caused by its source, AIDS? An editorial in TheNew York Times in response
to physicians putting personal concerns above patient concerns in refusing to care for
patients with AIDS states, "Any physician who holds that belief needs a new
profession" [34]. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop stated that such behav-
ior threatens "'the ethical foundation of health care itself'" [35]. This statement
implies a role for physicians in maintaining that ethical foundation by caring for
patients with AIDS, and it brings up the question of whether physicians have an
ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS.
A SEARCH FOR THE OBLIGATION IN TRADITION
Ihave a lotoffriends who arescared. Thosepeople that were supposed to be my
friends before, now that I'm sick, stopped coming around. Well, Ijust won't be
bothered with them.
I didn't know how myfather would take it. He hasfoster kids and when Igo
down thereI'm thebigbrother. Ifeel that ithithome down there because when my
mother told him about my illness afew weeks ago and he called me he was very
calm andcool. Hesaiddon't wony, everythingwillbeallright. Myfatherhasnever
expressed hisfeelings. I was totally shocked. He told my mother that out ofall the
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years I went down there on summer vacations, he said he neverpicked up on it,
thatIwasgay. Iknowthere'sdifferentthingsImightsay ordo, buthe neverknew.
I always took for granted that he knew. But my step-mother knew. That bugs
me-his callingregularly now. He andIwereneverclose.
Medicine asBusiness
Do physicians have an ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS? Physi-
cians, lawyers, and ethicists are finding that it is a question that probes at the essence
ofwhat it means tobe aphysician, and itis averyhard question to answer. It seems as
if it ought to be easy, since physicians are in the business of treating patients with
diseases. That, however, is one of the problems. Is medicine a business that allows
the physician total discretion for decision making, based on what the market can
bear, including the freedom to choose or reject patients at will and at whim? Or is
there some special moral dimension to the practice of medicine that calls forth
standards ofdedication over and above profit motive and free enterprise?
Emanuel asserts thatthe physician's obligation to treat patientswithAIDS derives
from his or her professional role. "The objective of a commercial enterprise is the
pursuit of wealth; the objective of the medical profession is devotion to a moral
ideal-in particular healing the sick and rendering the ill healthy andwell" [36]. The
fact ofmedicine as acommercial enterprise cannotbe ignored, however. Starrwrites,
The rise of a corporate ethos in medical care is already one of the most
significant consequences ofthe changing structure ofmedical care.... Every-
where one sees the growth ofa kind ofmarketingmentality in health care....
The organizational culture ofmedicine used to be dominated by the ideals of
professionalism and voluntarism, which softened the underlying acquisitive
activity. The restraint exercised bythose ideals now growsweaker. The health
center ofone era is the "profit center" ofthe next [37].
This "marketing mentality" has a direct bearing on both the decisions a physician
may make in deciding whom to treat and on the nature of the physician-patient
relationship. Patients with AIDS are destined for a long-drawn-out course of
devastating illnesses requiring very expensive types of tests and treatment. Fineberg
states that a recent report ofthe U.S. Public Health Service predicts 450,000 cases of
AIDS diagnosed bythe end of 1993 andprojected personal medical costsforpatients
with AIDS during 1991 ofbetween $4.5 and $8.5 billion [38]. Patients with AIDS do
not have the resources to cover those costs. About 40 percent of the 50,000 people
presently diagnosed with AIDS rely on Medicaid to cover their health care costs;
however, nearly half ofthe state Medicaid programs will not pay for one or more of
the drugs commonly used to treat AIDS. Furthermore, many states will not cover
those same drugs for people who are HIV-positive but have not yet developed AIDS
[39]. One year's worth ofzidovudine (AZT) can cost $4,000. Even when patients do
have private health insurance, most policies pay only a fraction of the cost of drugs
prescribed outside the hospital and oftenwill not cover at all the alternative types of
care needed by patients with AIDS, such as home and hospice care [38]. To say the
least, it is not worth a private physician's economic while to take on this sort of
burden.
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AIDS and the Law
Nor is a physician legally obligated to take on this burden. American common law
upholds the principles of individual liberty and economic freedom, and, when
applied to medicine, this concept has been called the "no duty rule" [40,41]. Annas
bluntly states,
... a physician is notobligated to treat anyparticularpatient in the absence of
a consensual doctor-patient relationship. In the absence ofa prior agreement
or a statutory or regulatory prohibition, physicians (like othercitizens) can, in
decidingwhether to accept patients, discriminate among them on the basis of
all sorts of irrelevant and invidious criteria; from race to religion, to personal
appearance andwealth, orby specific disease, like AIDS [40].
There are two exceptions to the physician's freedom to refuse to treat patients.
One exception is in the case ofphysicians working in an emergency room, who must
treat all patients who arrive with a medical emergency. This right to emergency
health care in an emergency room is the only legal right to health care guaranteed
anyone in this country, regardless ofone's illness orcondition. Theotherexception is
in the case ofa prior consensual physician-patient relationship. The law recognizes a
physician-patient relationshipbased oncontract; thatis, evenfromthe time apatient
phones a doctor's office to make an appointment for a specific purpose, there is an
implied contract between the two parties. This contractual relationship then imparts
to the physician the duty to treat. This contract, however, neither guarantees future
care for a new illness, nor does it require a physician to make an appointment with a
given patient in the first place [41].
Other contractual agreements to which physicians are a party may, however,
obligate them to treat patients with AIDS. For example, physicians working for
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or hospitals must abide by the rules and
regulations of those institutions and are not free to make independent decisions to
refuse to care for certain patients. The Associated Medical Schools of New York,
which represents the state's 13 public and private medical schools, issued a strong
policy statement on physicians' "most fundamental responsibility" to treat patients
with AIDS regardless ofrisk. " 'Communicable diseases have traditionally called for
sacrifice and courage from the medical community.... In addition, medical schools
and academic health centers have aspecial duty tofight notonlythe disease itselfbut
the fear and misinformation surrounding the disease.'" Students or physicians
refusing to treat patients with AIDS would be subject to dismissal [42]. An alternate
approach has been taken by Yale-New Haven Hospital, which, in 1987, adopted a
policy, recommended by its Bioethics Committee, that makes the clinical depart-
ments, but not individual physicians, responsible for assuring adequate care for
patients with AIDS [43].
A physician may be legally bound to treat patients with AIDS under federal or
state antidiscrimination legislation. The Rehabilitation Actof1973prohibits discrim-
ination on the basis ofhandicap in federally assisted programs. In 1987, the concept
of handicap was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to tuberculosis, an infectious
disease, but interestingly, in a footnote, the Court stated that the case was not about
AIDS [44].
The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation. Some states have
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similar statutes and include handicap as a basis of discrimination; about 30 states
specifically include AIDS as ahandicap [41]. Placesofpublic accommodation maybe
interpreted to include doctors' offices, hospitals, and nursing homes, so that refusing
to treat a patient with AIDS would be illegal. As Annas points out, however, "It will
... be difficult to define private doctors' offices as places of'public accommodation'
for the purposes of antidiscrimination laws. Private physicians' offices are generally
not open tothe publicwithout appointment; and even then access isgenerally limited
to certain diseases or categories of patients that the physician is capable of treating
and agrees to treat in advance" [40].
Physicians may or may not be required to care for patients with AIDS by state
licensing boards which have statutory authority to regulate the practice ofmedicine.
The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine, in June 1988, adopted AIDS
Guidelines, which state,
Licensedprofessionals have a dutytocare, treat orprovide services topersons
withAIDS, ARC orHIV-infection. Exceptions to thisobligation may occur in
clearlydefined, unusual instancesbut as ageneral rule, alllicensedprofession-
als should be aware of their affirmative duty to treat, care for or deliver
services to persons with AIDS, ARC or HIV-infection [45].
Stated possible exceptions to this obligation "in unusual cases" are a pregnant
physician who may be exposed to cytomegalovirus, and a physician who is ". . . not
equipped tomanagecertainclinical manifestations ofAIDS inwhichcaseprofession-
als should still offer non-specialized services" [45]. The guidelines specify that
violations may be dealt with by "remedial AIDS education," or "more stringent
sanctions might be imposed as appropriate."
Florida requires mandatory continuing education on AIDS for license renewal.
The Arizona Board of Medical Examiners, on the other hand, has stated that their
licensees may refuse continued treatment to patients with AIDS. The Board's
rationale is based on the following premises: First, some physicians, because of
personal reasons, may feel uncomfortable treating patients with communicable
diseases such as AIDS or hepatitis, and, therefore, might not provide adequate care.
Second, many physicians, at the time the policy was adopted, lacked a "true
understandingofcommunicable diseases, such asAIDS," and, therefore, itwould be
in the patients' best interest to transfer them to otherswith more expertise [46].
It is clear that we cannot look to the law for an obligation to care for patients with
AIDS; ". . . individual physicians have no legal duty to treat except in specific
situations" of which HIV positivity is not one [40]. Furthermore, ethical behavior
cannot be realistically legislated. AsAnnas points out, the law cannot force people to
be courageous orvirtuous [47]. A legal obligation is not the same thing as an ethical
obligation, and, in fact, legal remedy as a response to ethical omission often
mandates ill will. Since an answer to whether or not physicians have an ethical
obligation to care forpatientswith AIDS cannotbe found inthe law, itwill have tobe
sought elsewhere.
AIDS and the Profession
As stated earlier, Emanuel asserts that the physician's obligation to treat derives
from his or her professional role. "When a person joins the profession, he or she
professes acommitment to these ideals and acceptstheobligation to serve the sick. It
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is the profession that is chosen. The obligation is neither chosen nortransferable; it is
constitutive of the professional activity" [36]. Grounding this obligation to treat in
the profession is like saying that a doctor has to take care of patients with AIDS
because he or she is a doctor. This circular reasoning goes nowhere unless there are
qualities and traditions particular to the profession of medicine that mandate this
obligation in the face ofa tradition ofcommon law that does not. Furthermore, while
it may be evident that the medical profession as a whole has "a social contract" to
provide for the care of patients with AIDS because there is no other profession
competent to do so, it is not as evident that the obligation extends to individual
members of that profession [48].
Arras believes that this social contract approach is consistent with the voluntaristic
notion that patients with AIDS will get taken care ofby those physicians who want to
take care ofthem and not by those who do not. It breaks down only ifthe needs ofthe
patients are not met, and, in fact, harm is done because of the failure to provide
proper care. Arras easily foresees such harm coming about from delays in treatment
resulting from referring patients elsewhere, inadequate or substandard care result-
ing from lack of commitment of resources to an unpopular cause, and the very
rejection and stigmatization ofpatients by the physicians choosing not to treat them.
Under these circumstances, ". . . the social contract through the conditions of
licensure would justify the imposition of an individualized duty to treat" [48]. As
already noted, however, while licensure may compel individuals to treat, it does not
compel them to feel morally obligated. The obligation to treat can be grounded in a
profession only if the profession itself is clear and unambiguous about that obliga-
tion.
The position of the medical profession on a physician's obligation to care for
patients with AIDS may be understood, to an extent, by examining the principles and
codes of ethical conduct put forward by state and national professional organiza-
tions. While not all physicians belong to these organizations and presumably not all
subscribe to these so-called codes, as Freedman states, "On a descriptive level, they
may represent an expression of the profession's own conception of the ethical
obligations of its members.. ." [49]. It is clear from these codes and ethical
statements that the medical profession is ambivalent in its stand on this issue.
The American Medical Association (AMA) adopted its first Code of Medical
Ethics in 1847, which consisted of three chapters: "I. Of the duties of physicians to
their patients, and of the obligations of patients to their physicians;II. Of the duties
of physicians to each other, and to the profession at large; III. Of the duties of the
profession to the public, and of the obligations of the public to the profession" [50].
Thus, this code is a catalogue ofduties and obligations unilaterally put forward by the
profession but dictating norms of behavior for physicians and patients alike. It
differentiates between collective group obligations (the profession, the public) and
individual obligations (physicians, patients). It is important in its intent to voice
publicly acknowledgement ofa tie between the moral underpinnings ofmedicine and
a broader ethical rights/duties domain.
For the first time in any professional code, there is found documentation of a
thread ofprofessional commitment that even calls for self-sacrifice. It is a thread that
runs in and out ofthe tapestryofthe practice ofmedicine. Duties ofthe Profession to
the Public includes the following: ". .. and when pestilence prevails, it is their duty to
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face the danger, and to continue their labours for the alleviation of the suffering,
even at thejeopardy oftheir own lives" [51]. While the collective profession has the
duty to act in times of "pestilence," however, it is not clear whether or not the
individual does. That may be left up to him and his conscience. This chasm between
professional responsibilities and requirement for an individual response can be seen
towiden over the years.
In 1903, the title was changed from "Code" to "Principles of Medical Ethics"
[51a]. The tone of the revision of 1912 changes entirely, and, under "Duties of the
Profession to the Public" it states, "When an epidemic prevails, a physician must
continue his labors for the alleviation ofsuffering people, without regard to the risk
to his own health or life or to financial return" [52]. The plural of the 1903 version
".... continue their labours" has been replaced with "a physician must continue his
labors," appearing to individualize this duty. In 1912, however, the following
statement first appears:
Aphysician is free to choose whom he will serve. He should, however, always
respond to any request for his assistance in an emergency or whenever
temperate publicopinion expects the service. Once havingundertaken a case,
a physician should not abandon or neglect the patient because the disease is
deemed incurable; nor should he withdraw from the case for any reason until
sufficient notice of a desire to be released has been given the patient or his
friends to make it possible for them to secure another medical attendant [52].
Therefore, it was the duty ofthe profession to provide care in an epidemic. While
the 1912 version of the Principles appears to particularize this duty to individual
physicians by its use ofsingular pronouns, the new statement affirming a physician's
right to choose his patients modifies the epidemic duty. Yes, he should "continue his
labors," but he may choose for whom he wishes to labor. It is this last statement,
based on the notion of medicine as exemplar of the free enterprise system and to
which theAMAhasferventlyclungthroughout theyears, that has allowed physicians
to argue that there is no obligation to treat patients with AIDS. This thread of
personal choice appears to overshadow the thread of personal sacrifice. While this
1912 statement qualified the physician's freedom to choose patients except "in an
emergency orwhenever temperate publicopinion expects the service," thisqualifica-
tion lasted only until 1957.
For a very brief time in the revision of 1947, the Principles included the following
statement underThe Physician's Responsibility:
The profession ofmedicine, having for its end the common good ofmankind,
knows nothingofnational enmities, ofpolitical strife, ofsectarian dissensions.
Disease and pain the sole conditions of its ministry, it is disquieted by no
misgivings concerning the justice and honesty of its client's cause; but
dispenses its peculiar benefits, without stint or scruple, to men of every
country, and party and rank, and religion, and to men ofnoreligion at all [53].
Announced shortly after World War II, this statement seemed to affirm a commit-
ment of an idealistic profession able to rise above the mundane demands ofpolitics
and the forces that are divisive among people. It was a short-lived commitment,
however, when, in 1957, the Principles were streamlined to ten short statements
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called "Sections." Gone also was any mention of physicians' duties in time of
pestilence or epidemic.
In 1980, the Principles were revised for the last time and honed down to seven
brief legalistic statements. The preamble states, "As a member of this profession, a
physician must recognize responsibility not only to patients, but also to society, to
other health professionals, and to self' (emphasis added) [54]. Implied here is the
social contract between the profession and society. In fact, Section VII extends the
responsibility of a physician to "participate in activities contributing to an improved
community." Even though "a physician" as a member of the profession must
recognize this responsibility, Section VI staunchly declares, "Aphysician shall, in the
provision ofappropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choosewhom
to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical
services" [54]. At the same time, the profession wishes to assert recognition of an
obligation to act on behalf of society, it holds tightly to the individual freedom of
choice ofthe members ofthe profession.
This tension between individual choice and societal obligation led to confusion
and contradictions in the AMA's early statements directed at the specific question
regarding aphysician'sobligation to treat patientswithAIDS. In its 1986 "Statement
on AIDS," the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association held the following:
Physicians and other health professionals have a long tradition of tending to
patients afflicted with infectious disease with compassion and courage. How-
ever, not everyone is emotionally able to care for patients with AIDS. If the
health professional is unable to care for a patient with AIDS, that individual
should ask to be removed from the case. Alternative arrangements for the
care ofthe patient must be made [55].
This statement is reminiscent of a tradition of compassion and courage while
excusing physicians from taking care of patients with AIDS. A year later, this
statement was replaced by one taking a somewhat different stance.
In its 1987 statement, the AMA upheld the right ofpatients with AIDS to be free
from discrimination and went on to affirm the following:
A physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is
within the physician's current realm ofcompetence solelybecause the patient
is seropositive. The tradition of the American Medical Association, since its
organization in 1847, is that: "when an epidemic prevails, a physician must
continue his labors without regard to the risk to his own health... ." That
tradition must be maintained. A person who is afflicted with AIDS needs
competent, compassionate treatment. Physicians should respond to the best
of their abilities in cases of emergency where first aid is essential, and
physicians should not abandon patients whose care they have undertaken
[56].
For the first time since 1947, this statement mentions the maintenance of an
obligation to treat in the face ofpersonal risk.
The AMA statement goes on to interpret Section VI of the Principles of Medical
Ethics in relation to AIDS.
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Principle VI ofthe 1980 Principles ofMedical Ethics states that "Aphysician
shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be
free to choosewhom to serve, withwhom to associate, and the environment in
which to provide medical services." The Council has always interpreted this
Principle as not supporting illegal or invidious discrimination.... Thus, it is
the view of the Council that Principle VI does not permit categorical
discrimination against a patient based solely on his or her seropositivity. A
physician who is not able to provide the services required by persons with
AIDS should make an appropriate referral to those physicians or facilities
that are equipped to provide such services [56].
This statement no longer specifically limits inability to that of emotional etiology,
but it does continue to offer an out to physicians who "are not able" to take on
patients with AIDS. Another major difference between this statement and the
earlier one is that this statement attempts to modulate the AMA's stance on the
supremacy of the physician's individual choice regarding particular patients. Now it
is refined specifically to exclude blatant discrimination.
Some state medical associations have adopted their own policies on physicians'
responsibilities in the face of AIDS. For example, the Texas Medical Association
(TMA) adopted a simply stated policy: A physician may either accept responsibility
forthe care and treatment ofpatientswithAIDS orHIVor"infectionwith anyother
probable causative agent of AIDS," or the physician shall refer the patient to
another physician who will accept such responsibility [57]. Dr. James Mann, chair-
man ofTMA's Board ofCounselors, reportedly commented, " 'We didn't agree that
a physician who diagnoses AIDS is mandated to treat the patient.... I don't think it
can be called discrimination when it's a matter of a guy laying his health and career
on the line. Ayoung man [sic] may spend 15 years ofhis life getting medical training
and risk his life treating disease...." [58].
Otherprofessional organizations have also taken a stand on this issue. In 1986, the
American College of Physicians and The Infectious Diseases Society of America
issued a joint statement. Their position was to ". . . urge all physicians, surgeons,
nurses, other medical professionals, and hospitals to provide competent and humane
care to all patients, including patients critically ill with AIDS and AIDS-related
conditions. Denying appropriate care to sick and dying patients for any reason is
unethical" [59].
In 1988, these organizations took an even stronger stand when they said,
Refusal of a physician to care for a specific category of patients, such as
patients who have AIDS or who are HIV-positive, for any reason, is morally
and ethically indefensible. The practice of medicine is a societal trust and
carries with it a societal responsibility. If medicine wishes to retain its
respected status as the healing profession, we must continue to provide the
best possible care to our patients, regardless of personal risk. To do less
threatens the very nature of the patient-physician relationship, makes a
mockery ofour professional heritage, andviolates the very essence ofbeing a
physician [60].
This statement goes beyond appealing to physicians to behave well out of obliga-
tion to some vague notion of professional allegiance and touches on something
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undefined but deeper. To refuse to treat violates the essence ofbeing a physician and
does damage to the patient-physician relationship. The importance of this concept
will be examined and discussed further in a later section.
Another way of looking at a physician's obligation in terms of profession and
professional role is to examine actions of physicians in past major episodes of
infectious disease. What has been the historical response of physicians in times of
personal risk? What is the professional tradition passed from one generation of
physicians to another? The best that can be said is that medicine presents a mixed
tradition brightened with strands of exemplary courage and mired with moments of
cowardice. If all that could be found was a tradition of dedication and courage, it
might be said that a physician's obligation to treat is clearly grounded in historical
precedent.
It is difficult, however, to evaluate the meaning ofphysicians fleeing from plagues
and pestilence since, as Fox points out, "Much of the evidence about physicians
abandoning patients during epidemics, when read in context, furnishes no proofthat
such conduct violated prevailing ethical norms" [61]. Furthermore, some physicians
who stayed to care for patients during epidemics did so out of opportunity for
personal profit rather than for ethical motives.
Amundsen details physician behavior during the great plagues of Europe in the
Middle Ages [62]. Some physicians stayed and dedicated themselves to treating the
sick and dying, all the while concerned with precautions to be followed to prevent
their own exposure to the source of deadly disease. One physician of the time left a
16-point list ofprecautions tobe followed, some ofwhichbears astriking similarity to
modern-day body fluid precautions. On the other hand, some physicians fled from
the plague, choosing personal safety over professional obligation. Amundsen points
out, however, that this act should be judged while bearing in mind that there was a
very strong tradition, dating back to ancient classical medicine, that it was wrong to
treat a patient whom the art ofmedicine could not help.
Zuger and Miles look atphysician behavior in past epidemics in a search for .... a
coherent professional ethic governing the care of human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV)-infected persons..." [63]. They begin by noting that AIDS has little in
common with past epidemics in terms ofpersonal risk posed to physicians, since the
risks ofAIDS have been evaluated and can be controlled using proper precautions,
unlike the largely unknown risks ofpast infections. After a detailed overview ofboth
historical professional conduct and codes, theyconclude the following:
These examples illustrate the difficulties ofgrounding a professional ethic for
the care ofHIV-infected persons exclusively in historicprecedent andexisting
ethical codes. First, the professional tradition has not been consistent: in all
epidemics some physicians have fled and some have stayed, in most cases
impelled by individual conscience rather than professional ethic. Second, past
epidemics resemble AIDS very little, save only in the fear they have provoked
among some physicians. Finally, our ethical language differs enormously from
that of past centuries. Respect for individual civil rights and autonomy now
protects the discretionary freedom of physicians as well as of their patients
[63].
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AIDS and the Hippocratic Oath
In a final attempt to locate a physician's obligation to treat in tradition, the
Hippocratic Oath as a source ofthatobligation shouldbe considered. Generationsof
graduating medical students have sworn the Hippocratic Oath as they made the
transition to physician. What can be found in the Oath in support of a tradition to
care for patients in the face ofpersonal risk?
Nowhere in the Oath is there mention of an explicit obligation to care for sick
patients. The Oath,which Edelstein traces to the fourth centuryB.C., is reallywritten
in two parts. First, the physician's duties toward his teacher and his teacher's family
are acknowledged, as well as his obligation to pass on the teachings of medicine.
Second, there is a list ofrules the physicianvows to follow in the practice ofmedicine
[64]. In the list ofrules, is thefollowing: "Whateverhouses I mayvisit, Iwill come for
the benefit ofthe sick... ." Taken at face value, this may be considered a statement
ofpurpose. The physician is, comes, exists for the benefit ofthe sick. It does not say,
however, that the physician must take care ofall the sick, nor does it saythat he must
visit all houses. It says that the ones he does visit, he will visit for the benefit of the
sick. Kass interprets this passage to be a reference to the physician in relation to the
private life ofthe sick person; the physician comes ". . . this time not to define fitting
therapeutic means but to delimit proper interpersonal conduct.... The doctor
enters the intimate life-world ofthe patient and must act accordingly" [65].
The Hippocratic Oath is a part of the larger Hippocratic Corpus wherein clearer
statements of purpose of the physician may be found. May states that, "In general
terms, the art of healing attempted 'to do away with the sufferings of the sick, to
lessen the violence of their diseases, and to refuse to treat those who are overmas-
tered by their diseases, realizing that in such cases medicine is powerless' (Hip-
pocratic Corpus, L, VI, 4-6)" [66]. This last point is important. According to
Edelstein, the Hippocratic physician would naturally treat a patient who was not
seriouslyill,but, ifthe diseasewasserious, therewere reasonsfornottakingthe case.
One reason may be in the interest ofthe patient. Intervention when the patient was
critically ill might be harmful or might be considered harassment. Another reason
was in the interest of the physician, whose reputation would suffer with a bad
outcome [64]. Therefore, there is precedent in the Hippocratic Corpus for refusing
to care for seriously ill patients.
There may be danger in interpreting the Hippocratic Oath too literally or in
looking too hard at it for a literal pronouncement on the obligations of physicians.
Edelstein says, "The Oath as a whole is hardly an obligation enforced upon the
physicianby any authority but rather onewhich he accepted ofhis own freewill. It is
not a legal engagement; as the wording indicates, it is a solemn promise given and
vouchsafed onlybythe conscience ofhimwho swears" [64]. Perhaps itsvalue lies not
in its literal meaning, but in the meaning that the swearer ascribes to it. One
physician wrote in a letter to ajournal, "Aspublic awareness ofacquired immunode-
ficiencysyndrome (AIDS) reaches higherlevels, we asphysicians arebeingcalled on
through increasing numbers of articles and editorials to stand bravely in the face of
this disease and touphold ouroath to treatpatientsregardless ofpersonal risk" [11].
Perhaps it isenoughthatpeople thinkthatthe Oathincludes thispromise. Neverthe-
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less, the obligation ofphysicians to care for patients with AIDS cannot be grounded
in a literal interpretation ofthe Hippocratic Oath.
Thus, examination of the law, professional codes and principles, and complex
medical tradition fails to establish an incontrovertible ethical obligation on the part
of physicians to care for patients with AIDS. Instead, the rich tapestry of the
tradition of the practice ofmedicine, woven as it is with threads of self-sacrifice and
personal commitment as well as individualism and self-protection, presents a mixed
picture ofcontradiction and ambiguity.
MODERN ETHICAL MODELS OF MEDICAL CARE
My sisterand motherhave not been told. As longas I'm able to exist in society
andgo to work and keep my house I don't want to wony about involving them.
Eventually itwillcome to apointMom and Sis willhave toknowbecauseI'm not
goingto beable to take careofmyself IthinkwhenIgetoutofhereis when Ihave
todramatically startthinkingaboutwhich directionI'mgoingin. I'llhavetomake
dramatic changes-meaning selling my house, leaving myjob. I could ask my
mom ifIcouldlive with her, butthen I'llhave to letherknow.
Itakeprecautions. Idon't wantto thinkIcan do anythingIwant. Idon't want
tocauseanyoneelsetohaveit. SoItry toavoidtheladyin mylife. She'sveryclean
and she doesn't know. I don't want to destroy her life. One day I may get the
courage uptotellher. She's a verynicegirlandIdon'twanttohurther. That's the
really hard part about this. Right now I think it's better not to even have a
relationship.
The ContractModel
There are many modern ethical models of medical care. This discussion will be
limited to a few that exemplify current thinking. The one most commonly accepted
bothsocially and legallyhas alreadybeenmentioned, the contract model. This model
holds that the physician-patient relationship rests on a contract between the two
parties. This contract has legal force in that, once it has been established, the
physician may not terminate the relationship without giving the patient sufficient
time to find appropriate alternative care without being subject to liability for
abandonment. The duty not to abandon a patient has roots both in common law and
in professional principles of ethics. There is nothing here that suggests that a
physician must accept a particular patient or even a class of patients. Certainly,
within this model there is roomfor aphysician to say, "I shall not acceptpatientswith
AIDS."
This notion ofrelationship based on contractual agreement is consistent with the
current AMA Principles of Medical Ethics, Section VI: "A physician shall, in the
provision ofappropriate patient care, except inemergencies, be free to choosewhom
to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical
services" [54]. It is also consistent with the view of medicine as a commercial
enterprise where parties contract for goods or services as equal partners in a deal.
The rights and duties ofthe parties involved derive from the contract.
There are some positive points to this model.
The notion of the physician as contractor has obvious appeal. First, it breaks
with more authoritarian models (such as parent or priest). It emphasizes
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informed consent rather than blind trust; it encourages respect for the dignity
of the patient, who does not, because of illness forfeit autonomy as a human
being; it also encourages specifying rights, duties, conditions, and qualifica-
tions that limit the contract. In effect, it establishes some symmetry and
mutuality in the relationship between doctor and patient as they exchange
information and reach an agreement, tacit or explicit, to exchange goods
(money or services) [66].
On the other hand, there are problems with contractual medicine. Kass objects to
attempts to define medicine as a trade rather than as a profession. He points to the
inequality inherent in the "asymmetric" physician-patient relationship where the
patient is more dependent on the physician even if the patient is not sick when
seeking the services ofthe physician [65]. When thepatient issick, however, certainly
he or she is not capable ofentering fully and knowinglyinto a contract ofequals. The
law, however, recognizes adifferencebetween acommercial contractand aphysician-
patient contract orlawyer-client contract. These latter have been subject to fiduciary
responsibilitieswhere ". . . the normal rulesofbuyer and seller do not apply" [67]. In
a fiduciary relationship, one party needing help or expertise seeks it from another
party who, by virtue of his or her expertise or position to help, is held to be
trustworthy and ". . . is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests . . ." ofthe party seeking help [68].
Nevertheless, the contract model creates a cold image of two strangers coming
together but keeping their distance. In their detachment, they agree on what each
owes the other. There is no sense of emotion or involvement in human fears,
aspiration, pain, suffering, delight, modesty, or anyofthe otherfeelingsthat inreality
pass between physician and patient. There is no coming to know the other with
decisions flowing from that knowledge. This model is an example ofwhat Ladd calls
legalism, " '. . . the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule
following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by
rules' " [69].
Patients and physicians have certain rights and corresponding duties; however,
there is no duty to care for patients with AIDS unless it is explicitly spelled out in a
contract such as the sort previously mentioned between a physician and a particular
hospital orHMO. Then apatientwithAIDS at that institution has the right to expect
to be treated.
The CovenantModel
According to May, the contract model falls short in not allowing for anticipation of
the individual nuances, contingencies, and changes of focus inevitably a part of the
physician-patient relationship; therefore the contract is external to the parties
involved. May proposes a different model that is internal to the parties involved, that
of the covenant modeled on the promises to God as revealed in the Scriptures.
"Covenants cut deeper into personal identity" [66]. The act of entering into a
covenant alters the verybeing ofthe one who promises. "Initiation into a profession
means, in effect, that the physician is a healerwhen healing andwhen sleeping, when
practicing and when malpracticing" [66]. This model also assumes protection for the
more disadvantaged participants when there is an imbalance of power in the
relationship.
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Asopposed to a marketplace contractual ethic, thebiblical notion ofcovenant
obliges the more powerful to accept some responsibility for the morevulnera-
ble and powerless of the two partners. It does not permit a free rein to
self-interest, subject only to the capacity of the weaker partner to protect
himself or herself through knowledge, shrewdness, and purchasing power
[66].
From the covenantal bond, one may even fashion an obligation to treat. The
physician's need for patients is acknowledged. In fact, ". . . areciprocityofgiving and
receiving nourishes the professional relationship" [66]. Thus, becoming a physician
entails recognition oftheparamount importance ofthe patient inwhat itmeans tobe
aphysician. Thebeginningphysician owes adebt tothepatientwho allows himselfor
herself to be learned on, a debt that gets paid in service to future patients.
A strength of the covenant model is that it calls for a commitment to treat not
based on any individually established relationship. In other words, the physician-
patient relationship is notjust aresult ofwhowalksinthedoorand is acceptedbythe
physician. The commitment to treat is a priori because it is not made just to the
individual patientbut to all patients, to the profession, and to God.
The major problem with the covenant model is that its ontological effects derive
from a religious construct. Motivation to behave well comes from belief in a higher,
spiritual good. It is amotivation that manyphysicians can find easy to reject, and one
that does not meet the more universal needs ofa medical ethic.
The Virtue-BasedModel
In an attempt to capture a more acceptable motivation for behaving well, Zuger
and Miles have proposed a virtue-based medical ethic. Zuger and Miles refer to
Scribonius Largus, afirst-century A.D. Roman physician, who wrote that to belong to
a profession means that one is committed to a certain end and has accepted an
obligation to perform duties in order to achieve that end. For medicine, the end is
healing, and the duties involve treating the sickpeople requiring care.
"In its simplest sense, an ethic of virtue requires a virtuous moral agent whose
character can be nurtured and trained and who can be held morally accountable for
his actions" [63]. Once aphysicianvoluntarily chooses tojoin themedical profession,
he or she accepts both that the end ofmedicine is healing and that to reach that end
he or she must treat sickpatients. The commitment, therefore, is over and above and
independent of any commitment that follows to individual patients. A virtuous
physicianwill then act in accordwith this commitment or riskbeing held accountable
bythe profession for itsviolation.
What are the virtues demanded of a good physician? Once identified, they would
become integral to the practice of medicine. Assuming personal risk while treating
patients with contagious disease would certainly require virtuous behavior. Zuger
and Milesbelieve that the degree ofriskposedbytreatingpatientswithAIDSwould
not call forvirtues on the order ofheroism, self-sacrifice, or daring, but for courage
and intellectual integrity. Dr. Rieuxin ThePlaguebyCamus,who stays to care forthe
people inthe plague-ridden city, would thusbeconsidered avirtuousphysicianwhen
he says,
". . . there's one thing I must tell you: there's no question of heroism in all
this. It's a matter of common decency. That's an idea which may make some
people smile, but the only means offighting a plague is-common decency."
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"What do you mean by 'common decency'?" Rambert's tone was grave.
"I don't knowwhat it means for other people. But in my case I know that it
consists in doing myjob" [70].
Medicine as a Practice
Understanding the motivation for a physician to behave virtuously is a little more
problematic. In other words, how do we answer the question, what's in it for me? It
can be done by digressing slightly and delving more deeply into medicine as a
practice in the sense intended by Maclntyre, who defines a practice as a ". . . coher-
ent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form ofactivity. . ." [71]. While a practice requires knowledge and
exercise of technical skills, it is not just a collection of those technical skills. The
technical skills are put to use in achieving internal goods which are central to and
partially definitive ofthe practice. Another crucial element to a practice is its history,
so that "To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its
contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the
practice.. ." [71]. Thus, a practice has an ongoing story that is informed by the
stories of its practitioners; it is a story ofstories. To use the metaphor withwhich we
began, a practice is a rich unfinished tapestry created and added to with threads
woven by the individual practitioners.
To understand the difference between internal and external goods, Maclntyre
gives an example of a child learning how to play chess. Playing chess, according to
Maclntyre, is a practice. At first the child is not really interested in learning to play
the game but is motivated to play and ultimately to win by the fifty cents that she will
earn upon doing so. In order to win, the child will even cheat. Eventually, however,
the child realizes that there is pleasure derived out of not merely winning for the
money, but from "those goods specific to chess ... the achievement of a certain
highly particular analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity"
[71]. Maclntyre points out that goods external to the practice, for example, money,
status, fame, may all be achieved in other ways; however, those goods internal to the
practice can only be achieved through participation in that practice. In fact, the
goods internal to a practice can only be achieved through virtuous participation. If
the child continues to cheat, she will never come to know the glory of winning
through analytical skill and strategic imagination, nor will she appreciate a relation-
ship between herself and her partner built purely on honest encounter.
External goods, when achieved, become someone's property. There is a finite
amount of them; therefore, when one person achieves a quantity, there is less for
other persons. As a result, there is competition for external goods, with resultant
winners and losers. With internal goods, there is competition to excel; however, a
major difference is that achievement ofinternal goods, while limited to practitioners,
is a good for the whole community participating in the practice. Thus, for example, a
painter creating a masterpiece or a musician composing a brilliant symphony
contributes to the advancement of art and music and enriches all of the interested
community [71].
What are the goods internal to the practice of medicine, and what are the virtues
necessary to achieve them? Maclntyre identifies three virtues necessary to any
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practice. They arejustice, courage, and honesty. Justice requires that we treat others
uniformly and impartially. Courage is the capacity to risk harm or danger in
exercising care or concern for individuals or communities. Honesty requires that we
speak the truth. Without these, the achievement of excellence and of internal goods
is impossible. Ladd points out some virtues necessary to the practice of medicine,
". .. it seems obvious that it is both possible and desirable to have doctors who are
kind, compassionate, generous, courageous and wise in their capacity as doctors.
Virtues like these are elements ofwhat it means to be a good doctor" [72]. Still, there
may be other virtues essential to achievement of the as yet unidentified goods
internal to the practice ofmedicine.
Achievement ofgoods is not all that is involved when one participates in a practice.
Practice, as Maclntyre envisions it, also involves standards of excellence and obedi-
ence to rules [71]. The rich history and traditions of a practice contribute to these
standards and partially define the practice. At the same time, however, the history
and traditions reflect the continued participation and debate of the practitioners. In
this way, the tapestry is never finished.
As we have already discovered, the standards of the practice of medicine, even as
they are informed by its history and traditions, are what we are questioning. In terms
of an obligation to care for patients with AIDS, so far the practice of medicine has
not been wholly satisfying. That is not to say that this standard does not exist within
the practice ofmedicine. Finding its threads maybe contingent on identifying certain
goods internal to the practice of medicine and the virtue or virtues required to
achieve them. It may require examining the problem in a different way.
Practice versus Institution
Before turning to a different medical ethic, it would be worthwhile to look at the
distinction that Maclntyre draws between practices and institutions. While medicine
is a practice, a hospital or an HMO is an institution. The difference between the two
is that an institution is "characteristically and necessarily" concerned with external
goods. A hospital must put its energy into billing, collecting payments, buying
equipment and skills, paying salaries, giving promotions, recognizing and rewarding
achievements. Its very structure relies on the acquisition and distribution of money,
power, and status. But the hospital as an institution is also enmeshed with the
practice of medicine. The hospital, in fact, works to sustain the practice of medicine
which could not survive without this sustenance.
Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions-and
consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in
question-that institutions and practices characteristically form a single
causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always
vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative
care for common goods ofthe practice is always vulnerable to the competitive-
ness of the institution [71].
It is easy to see the corrupting influence of the institution of the hospital on the
practice of medicine. As already noted, there is a "marketing mentality" arising in
medicine that blurs the distinction between institution and practice to the point that
we speak of the institution of medicine. Emanuel differentiates between the objec-
tive of the commercial enterprise, the pursuit of wealth, and the objective of the
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medical profession, devotion to a moral ideal. Yet preservation ofthe free enterprise
ideal of free choice of whom to serve seems strongly to take precedence over any
moral ideal of healing the sick. Conceptualization of the physician-patient relation-
ship as one based on contract strengthens this image. Freedman makes this point
clearly when he states, "Legally, as independent contractors, physicians are accus-
tomed to being free ofanyobligation to attend to patients" [49]. The powerful forces
of the institution often dominate the moral ideal of practice. Furthermore, as the
major environment for the education of medical students and beginning physicians,
the hospital places emphasis on external rewards that is often in conflict with
achievement of internal rewards ofthe practice ofmedicine. It is in the hospital that
new physicians are socialized into the way of institutions rather than the way of
practices.
THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
I'vebeen usingdrugs 15years. Istartedhangingaroundwith the wrongpeople. I
was about 16. Ihadthisoneperson who wasclose. Everywhereyou'dgoyou'dsee
us two together. Ifound out he was using. He said, "Hey, man, you wanna get
high?" Finally, Isaidyes. I wanted to be like him and he wanted to be like me.
Anythingwedid wedidtogether. Isaidsincehedidit, I'lldo it.
I've lived there sixyears so I havefriends. I can make a friend ofanybody. I
don't think they know I'm ill. I'd just as soon as not-they would just ask
questions.
It'shardtorelate to myown brothersandsisters aboutthis. Ihaven'ttoldthem.
Ifeelit'saproblemI'vecreated, I'vebroughton myself. Idon'twanttobringheavy
burdens on myfamily. Theydon'tknow.
Do physicians have an ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS? It is now
clear that this question cannot be addressed in terms ofrights and duties. Legalism is
not the answer. There are no laws to demand, there are no universal rules to instruct,
there is no obvious requirement based on tradition to invoke with consequent
entitlement. While the tradition of the practice of medicine offers glimpses of the
threads of obligation, they must be pulled together to create an unmistakable
pattern. If that strong nagging sense, that feeling, that physicians ought to care for
patients with AIDS has validity, that validity must come from a heretofore unex-
plored source so fundamental to the practice of medicine that it cannot be denied.
From where does that "ought" come? One way of locating that fundamental source
is to learn more about the practice of medicine by examining what some contempo-
rary writers on medical ethics have to say about the purpose of the practice of
medicine and how it is achieved.
ThePurpose ofthePractice ofMedicine
Kass states, "I trust it will shock no one if I say that I am rather inclined to the
old-fashioned view that health-or if you prefer, the healthy human being-is the
end of the physician's art" [65]. Kass is quick to point out that there is a difference
between healthy and alive. He is not suggesting that the purpose ofmedical practice
is always to keep patients alive. Next to the goal ofhealth, he places the goal ofrelief
of suffering and comfort. He equates healthiness with its etymological root defini-
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tion, wholeness. To make healthy is to makewhole, to maintain health is to maintain
wholeness. An assault to one part ofthe person is an assault to the whole person. A
state ofhealth is a particular organism's natural norm. A return to health, therefore,
is a return to "thewell-working ofthe organism as awhole ... an activityofthe living
body in accordance with its specific excellences" [65]. A return to health must also
involve attention to the soul and/or psyche. In asituationwhen there is no longer the
possibility of returning a patient to a "well-working" whole, however, " . .. when
reasonable hope of recovery is gone, [the physician] acts rather to comfort the
patient and to keep him company, as a friend and not especially or uniquely as a
physician" [65].
For Kass, the purpose of the practice of medicine is, to the extent possible, to
maintain or restore the state ofhealth, ofwholeness. This is not, however, an activity
that can be accomplished by the physician alone. It requires a relationship between
physician and patient. Kass asks the question: Whom does the doctor serve? He
answers, "He serves his patients: the ill, the diseased, the dying, and also the
worried-well who might be ill, diseased, or dying" [65]. The goal of the practice of
medicine can only be fulfilled in relation to another, the patient.
Cassell chooses different language to arrive at basically the same point. He begins
by differentiating among the terms "disease," "illness," and "sickness." Disease is
something that affects an organ or a system, illness is what the person experiences.
As the illness deepens, the patient enters a state ofsickness.
Disease begins the assault that threatens the person's "wholeness," ofwhich Kass
speaks. Cassell puts it another way. A person's health or wholeness is characterized
by connectedness, and the degree ofhis or her sickness is measured by the extent of
diminution and loss ofconnection.
In health we know we are alive by our connectedness to the world. When we
are totally disconnected we are dead. We are connected to the world by
numerous physical phenomena-touch, sight, balance, smell, taste, hearing-
and also by our interest in things and in others, by our feelings for people, by
what we do and how necessary we are, by our place in the social s,cheme. To
the degree that we feel real confidence in those connections, small details are
unimportant and losing those connections is not so frightening as losing
others. In illness, however slight, some ofthese contacts are lost....
As illness deepens, connections are increasingly cut offby the symptoms of
sickness and by the forced withdrawal from society caused by sickness [73].
Furthermore, this loss ofconnectedness bothbrings about and is enhanced byloss of
a sense ofpersonal omnipotence and failure ofreason, and loss ofcontrol over one's
existence [73].
This loss of connectedness is beautifully revealed by Simenon in his novel, The
Bells ofBicetre, about a successful French newspaper publisher named Maugras who
suffers a stroke and ends up in the hospital hemiplegic and temporarily aphasic. The
story unfolds through the thoughts and feelings of Maugras as he faces a new
existence cut off from who he was and what previously defined him. He begins to
believe that "There was a conspiratorial world about him to which they all be-
longed.... As for him, he lay inert in his bed, at the mercy ofpeople who compared
notes about him, discussed his case, and passedjudgement on him" [74]. As he loses
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touch with his old world and his old self, he finds even his thoughts altered by the
experience of illness, "Thus a very ordinary starting point was enough to set going a
train ofthoughts which in normal lifewould have seemed absurd to him" [74].
The importance of differentiating between disease and illness becomes clear in
understanding Cassell's view of the goal and purpose of the practice of medicine.
The physician is the healer who, in relationship with the patient, maintains or
restores connection, or, to use Kass's terms, maintains or restores wholeness. To do
so the physician must know the patient well in order to know the manifestations of
illness for that patient. The restoration ofconnection comes about through connec-
tion of physician and patient. This is not a dispassionate and impersonal curing of
disease. "Science does not serve patients in some unembodied manner; it does so
through their doctors-in the relationship between patient and doctor" [73]. Both
Kass and Cassell agree on the moral aspect ofthe physician-patient relationship [65].
Kass states, "I conclude that medicine necessarily remains a unique and intrinsically
moralprofession, with its own special norms and dutiesflowingfrom ... themutually
shared self-consciousness ofthe doctor-patient relationship...."
Thus, for these men, the purpose ofthe practice ofmedicine is a complex activity
called healing, accomplished in and through relationship with another, the patient.
The elements that each assigns to the activity of healing may be different and the
language that each uses to describe it certainly is different. Kass chooses language
evocative ofan image ofhealer/strangerwho, having been soughtvoluntarilyby one
in need, is wholly knowing and understanding of the patient's vulnerability. But it is
Cassell who comes closest to articulating that the relationship itself empowers and
motivates the physician.
ForCassell, beingaphysician is rooted in thevery same connectedness so essential
tothe healingfunction, to the restoration ofthepatient's health. When he states, "In
healthwe knowwe are alive byourconnectedness to theworld ... by ourfeelings for
people, bywhat we do and how necessary we are, by our place in the social scheme"
[73], he does notjust mean patients. He says "we." Physicians, too, find themselves,
expressthemselves, come alive in connection, inrelationship, thevery same relation-
ship that is instrumental in achieving the goal of the practice of medicine. The
physician is physician in relationship, with colleagues and students, but especially
withpatients; " . . . he cancomfort and reassure in a manner sobasicthat it is related
toexperiences inearly infancy. His ability tomake these connectionswith thepatient
does not stand apart from his other acts as ahealerbut iswoven into the entire fabric
ofthe healing function" [73].
There is a commonly accepted appeal to detachment in the practice of medicine
that causes some confusion and leads to tentativeness in relationship and seeming
contradiction. Physicians commonly advocate holding back, "not getting involved,"
keeping their emotional distance from patients purportedly as a method of self-
protection from loss ofobjectivity and emotional burnout. Mermann has found that
physicians say, on the one hand, that establishing distance between selfand patients
may help to alleviate job-related stress, while, on the other hand, the true gratifica-
tion ofbeing a physician comes from the extent of commitment to relationship [75].
Often there is not enough time, nor is encouragement given to take time, to
appreciate fully relationship and the gratification that flows from it [15].
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Relationship
It is relationship then that is the central feature, the essence, of the practice of
medicine. Only in relationship can the physician carry out his or her important
purpose ofhealing. From relationship comes the ought, the imperative forphysicians
to care for patients with AIDS. Rather than look to an ethic based on rights,
derivative obligations implyingmotivationfrom an authorityoutsidethe self,whether
it may be a rule or a law or a professional code, there must be an alternative ethic
motivated fromwithin the self. This motivation comes not from the selfin relation to
God as conceived in May's covenant, but from the self in relation to other people.
Ladd, in rejecting legalism for this purpose, finds, "The moral duties that stem from
interpersonal relationships can be brought together under the more general concept
of responsibility.... a concern that a person ought to have for another person's
welfare by virtue of a special relationship that obtains between him and the other
person" [69].
This is not the potentially adversarial relationship between rights-holder and
rights-owner as characterized by the contract model [76]. This is a giving and
receiving relationship where both parties have something to gain, each from the
other. The doctor has special knowledge to use in order to help heal, but the patient
has special knowledge, too. The patient has knowledge ofhimselfor herself, without
which the physician can only treat disease, not illness. Cassell puts it, "In the doctor
patient relationship the sick person needs the doctor. The doctor also needs the sick
person" [73].
The centrality ofrelationship to the practice ofmedicine is special but not unique.
Parenting and teaching, for example, are also defined in relationship. In contrast,
some other practices, especially those with a service component, may consider
relationship an element, but it is not the essential feature. Take, for example, the
practice offirefighting. The firefighter does not fulfill his or her goal in relationship.
Certainly there must be cooperation with and dependency on other firefighters, just
as there must be among physicians, and certainly, when faced with an air-starved
child, the firefighter relates intimately with that child and provides resuscitation and
oxygen. There is an imperative to do so out of the nature of the practice, but the
momentary intimacy, while it may occur, does not need to occur ever for the
firefighter to be a firefighter. The firefighter can fulfill the goals of the practice with
hose and axe and ladder and burning building.
Similarly, different specialties in the practice of medicine ground themselves to a
greater or lesser degree in relationship. It is true that every specialty requires
patients to exist, but the actual relationship may be peripheral to the practitioner's
activities. For example, pathologists may fulfill their goals without knowing or
entering into relationship with patients. The same may be true for certain radiolo-
gists. Some surgical specialties may behave minimally in relationship. In the operat-
ing room, anesthesia and the elaborate dance of draping the patient exclude the
patient's personality and leave the surgeon only a deep red hole with which to
interact. Pediatrics, internal medicine, family medicine, obstetrics and gynecology-
these are the practices that are or ought to be whollygrounded in relationship, those
subsequently referred to as "core" practices.
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THE "CORE" PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
Youshouldn'tcondemn aperson becausehe'sinfected. Itdoesn'tmakehim a bad
person. It's the difference between knowing something in your head and in your
heart-accepting it. I think it's a doctor'sjob too. You have to get to knowyour
patients. Thatwayaperson can trustyou more. Thatwayifsomethinghappens he
can turn toyou because he can trustyou. It's hardtogetreally close to one doctor
because they'll be here two weeks and then they'regone and they'll assignyou to
someoneelse.
Ienjoy thepeople here. Ilook at it as a hospitalbut it's also aplace to relate to
people. Igetalongwithpeople. ThisistheheartI'vegot.AslongasI'vebeen on the
street myheart has notturned cold. Ican't turn my backon aperson. Ilook at it,
whatgoes aroundcomesaround. Somedayyou maybe the onein need.
How does one find a requirement to care for patients with AIDS based on the
central and fundamental importance of relationship to the practice of medicine?
One needs to locate the motivation for behaving morally in the fact of relationship.
In other words, the goods internal to the practice of medicine need to be seen as
accruing from relationship in order for relationship to be motivational. Itwill help to
define relationship according to the "self-other" relation as outlined by Whitbeck in
her ontology.
A Different Ontology [77]
Whitbeck accepts Maclntyre's definition of a practice but develops her ontology
around acertain sort ofpractice, what she considers the "core" practice, "th4t ofthe
(mutual) realization of people" [78]. Both teaching and healing are core practices.
She proposes " . . . a self-other relation that is assumed to be a relation between
beings who are in some respects analogous, and the scope and limits ofthat analogy
... are something to be explored in each case" [78]. This concept is different from
more traditional ontologies based on an oppositional dualism wherein the other is
defined as opposite to the self. Oppositional dualism, Whitbeck points out, is the
basis for the ontological theories of many philosophers from Aristotle to Freud. In
such an ontology, for example, altruism is defined by being the opposite of egoism,
teacher is the opposite of student, and physician is the opposite of patient. In an
oppositional dualism, the self proves itself in a struggle to master the other. "A
recurrent tendency that results from the opposition of self and other is to deny the
existence ofthe other to a greater or lesser degree or to make any existing other into
the self' [78]. As an aside, it is noteworthy that this tendency is certainly exaggerated
when the patient has a disease like AIDS, which possesses polluting capacity in the
sense discussed by Douglas [20,79].
In Whitbeck's view, the self and other may have different characteristics but they
are not opposites. They also have many similar characteristics. In fact, it is more
appropriate tospeakofself-others since therelation is not fundamentallydyadic. The
self is not defined in a succession of dualistic encounters, but in a more complex
constant and ongoing exposure to enriching others [78]. Since the selfand others are
analogous beings, they are also complementary beings. She states,
Since the relations ofthe selfto others are relations among analogous beings,
and the scope and limits ofthat analogy are to be discovered or, ifthe other is
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a person, to be mutually created and transformed, relationships between
people are understood as developing through identification and differentia-
tion, through listening and speaking with each other, rather than through
struggles to dominate or annihilate the other [78].
Since one is not defined in opposition to others, one is defined in relation to others.
In this view, " . . . relationships to other people are fundamental to being a person,
and one cannot become a person without relationships to other people" [78]. Past
relationships as well as future relationships nurture, enhance, and contribute to the
completion ofthe person.
Self-Realization
Whitbeck's relationships are "lived relationships." She is careful to point out that
the concept ofrelationship isdifferent fromthe notion ofa rolewhich is not in and of
the selfbut may be cast offifconvenient," .... something that a person can take on
and later reject and be no more affected by than the clothing one has temporarily
worn" [78]. Whitbeck's ontology as applied to the physician is similar to May's claim
that " . . . the physician is a healerwhen healing and when sleeping, when practicing
and when malpracticing"[66]. Furthermore, as stated earlier, physicians andpatients
need each other. In the context of Whitbeck's ontology, they need each other in
order that they may be themselves. As May puts it, "No one can watch a physician
nervously approach retirement without realizing how much the doctor has needed
the patients to be himself or herself' [66]. This point is also echoed in Cassell's
concept of connection, "Our place in society, group identity, and our loved ones
allow us to define ourselves. Without them we are nothing" [73]. In other words, in
relationship with patients, the physician has the opportunity to express, to come to
know and to see himselfor herself.
In the practice of medicine, the central, fundamental construct on which rests
fulfillment ofthe goals ofthe practice is relationship. This relationship is central also
to the self-realization ofthe physician/practitioner. Therefore, it is from relationship
that spring goods internal to the practice of medicine, one of which can now be
identified as self-realization [80].
Responsibility
Whitbeck's ontology is the basis for an ethic that recognizes as the fundamental
moral notion responsibility ". . . for (some aspect of) another's welfare arising from
one's relationship to that person" [78]. This ethic differs from the rights view of
ethics, which holds that a moral right is the fundamental moral notion wherein
People are viewed as social and moral atoms, armed with rights and reason,
and actually orpotentially in competition and conflictwith one another.... If
any attention is given to relationships on the rights view, it is assumed they
exist on a contractual or quasi-contractual basis and that the moral require-
ments arising from them are limited to rights and obligation [78].
In contrast, an ethic of responsibility does not proffer a set mode of conduct in
response to a stated claim, butcallsfordiscretion onthe partofthe responsible agent
[81]. It is the moral integrity of the responsible agent that is at stake in deciding to
behave responsibly, a decision that arises from a position of relation, of care, of
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concern. In fact, Ladd states, ". . . being responsible is a kind of virtue, and being
irresponsible is a kind ofvice; for it is impossible to be agood parent, agood friend, a
good doctor, or a good nurse without taking one's responsibilities for the other
seriously, that is acting responsibly toward him, being responsible" [69].
Thus, a heretofore unidentified virtue essential to achievement ofself-realization,
a good that is internal to the practice ofmedicine, is responsibility. The physician is
physician in relationship to patients and only to the extent that he or she acts
virtuously in being morally responsible for and to those patients. Recall that a
characteristic of internal goods is that their achievement is a good for the whole
community participating in the practice. Since, as Whitbeck states,
... the fulfillment ofthe responsibilities for thewelfare ofothers that attends
one's relationships to them is essential to the maintenance ofmoral integrity,
each person's moral integrity is integrally related to the maintenance of the
moral integrity of others. Thus, on this view their self-interest is not some-
thing that can be neatly separated from the interests ofothers.... all parties
to the relationship and participants in the practice emerge and develop and
therefore, the relationships and practices also develop [78].
Therefore, by entering into relationship with and beingmorally responsible to and
for patients, physicians both fulfill themselves as physicians and further the good of
the practice of medicine. But what about patients with AIDS? The fundamental
question continues to haunt: Must physicians enter into relationship with all pa-
tients, including patients with AIDS, in order to achieve self-realization, or may
physicians achieve self-realization through the relationships that they choose to
enter?
THE ESSENCE OF THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
Last time I was in the hospital Ialmost died. I was disappointed thatIhadn't
died. Then it would have been all over. My family wouldn't-right now they
haven'tgonethrough anythingthey'llhave togothrough. Itwouldhave been over.
NowIhave tolookforwardtoitallahead. It'sgoingto beharderon them than on
me. They've neverseen it. Iknow what to expect. Seeingothers-afriendofmine
was diagnosed down in Jersey and three weeks later we weregoing to hisfuneral.
Mymotherandmyfamilyhaveneverseen anythinglikeit. TheyknowI'mgoingto
have my good days and bad days, but they don't know that my bad days will
outweigh thegoodones.
From their research, Gilligan and Lyons have identified two distinct modes of
describing the self in relation to others-separate/objective and connected. The
separate/objective selfrelies on impartiality, objectivity, and detachment in relation-
ships in order to be attentive to rules and maintain fairness. The connected selfrelies
on interdependence, responsiveness, and caring. Lyons states, "To be responsive
requires seeing others in their own terms, entering into the situations of others in
order to know them as the others do, that is, to try to understand how they see their
situations" [82,81,83]. The practice ofmedicine requires each ofthese approaches at
various times. As already noted, theobligation to care forpatientswithAIDS cannot
be located in rules and an appeal tolegalistic fairness. It can, however, be located in a
practice which has as its essence relationship based on responsibility and caring.
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Caring
It is important to keep in mind that physicians need relationship for all of the
reasons already discussed and that that relationship is a "caring" relationship; the
physician cares for the patient and not only in the medical sense. To support this
claim, merelythinkofhowwrong it sounds to saythat physicians do not orshould not
care for their patients. In order to act responsibly toward the patient, the physician
must have regard for the patient and a desire to act for the patient's well-being.
Theoretically an unengaged physician may treat a patient's disease, but to treat a
patient's illness one must come to know and care forthepatient as a person. In order
to restore a patient to wholeness and connection, the physician must have some
knowledge ofwhatwholeness and connection mean for that patient. This knowledge
comes about through caring. Caring, therefore, may be considered a virtue in the
practice of medicine. This is not a novel idea. In 1927, Peabody, a highly regarded
clinician and teacher, wrote, the secret ofthe care ofthe patient is in caring for
the patient" [84].
Caring is not the same thing as loving. Both involve engrossment in the one cared
for, but the intensity and duration of engrossment vary. Loving is one type ofcaring.
Noddings explains,
While I care for my children throughout our mutual lifetimes, I may care only
momentarily for a stranger in need. The intensity varies. I care deeply for
those in myinner circles and more lightlyforthose removed from mypersonal
life.... The acts performed out ofcaringvarywithboth situational conditions
and type ofrelationship.... At bottom, all caring involves engrossment. The
engrossment need not be intense nor need it be pervasive in the life of the
one-caring, but it must occur. This requirement does not force caring into the
model of romantic love, as some critics fear, for our engrossment may be
latent for long periods [85].
Noddings builds on Whitbeck's ontology and accepts relation as basic when she
develops an ethic ofcaring. She uses the terms "one-caring," which for our purpose
is the physician, and "cared-for," the patient. In caring, the one-caring "feels with"
the cared-for. Noddings differentiates "feeling with" from empathy, a form of
projection ofone's personality on to another in order to attempt to understand his or
her feelings or actions. Noddings states,
The notion of "feeling with" that I have outlined does not involve projection
but reception. I have called it "engrossment." I do not "put myself in the
other's shoes," so to speak, by analyzing his reality as objective data and then
asking, "Howwould I feel in such a situation?" On the contrary, I set aside my
temptation to analyze and to plan. I do not project; I receive the other into
myself, and I see and feel with the other [85].
To the senses through which Noddings receives the other can be added touch, since
the physician also receives the patient through his or her hands and fingers.
The Story
The physician first receives the patient through the patient's story, his or her
narrative. Brody states, "We are, in an important sense, the stories ofour lives. How
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sickness affects us depends on how sickness alters those stories" [86]. The physician
cannot know a patient until he or she hears the patient's story. Recall that Whitbeck
says that relationships develop through listening and speaking with each other.
Brody considers the physician's openness to story to be an ingredient of his or her
compassion, or, to use the language we startedwith, caring. In fact, in the giving and
receiving ofthe patient's storybegins the growth ofthe fullness ofrelationshipwhich
has the potential to culminate in self-realization for the virtuous physician. Physi-
cians, too, have stories, stories that tell tales of relationship. These stories then are
woven into the unfinished tapestry that is the story ofthe practice ofmedicine.
AlthoughNodding's descriptionofreceptivityseems to have a mysticalquality, it is
not mystical. It is descriptive ofa common transformation that occursbyinterlocking
stories, by getting to know someone in such a way that the knowledge causes one's
ideas to change or be affected so that, where before the person may have been a
stranger or a superficial acquaintance, now the person is a cared-for.
Noddings describes the transformation that takes place as she receives a teacher
forwhom previously she had little regard.
Somewhere in the light banter of lunch talk, he begins to talk about an
experience in the wartime navy and the feelings he had under a particular
treatment. He talks about how these feelings impelled him to become a
teacher. His expressions are unusually lucid, defenseless. I am touched-not
only by sentiment-but by something else. It is as though his eyes and mine
have combined to look at the scene he describes. I know that I would have
behaved differently in the situation, but this is in itself a matter of indiffer-
ence. I feel what he says he felt. I have been invaded by this other. Quite
simply, I shall neveragainbe completelywithout regard for him.... I am now
prepared to carewhereas previously Iwas not.
The transformation that takes place through caring for a member ofan outcast or
stereotyped group can cause one to realize that there is a unique person behind the
stereotype. That realization can make it impossible for one ever again to generalize
with such confidence.
While Noddings's receptive mode is primarily affective, listening, looking, feeling,
it is often accompanied by a lateral move into a mode of rational problem solving.
Noddings says, "We quite properly enter a rational-objective mode as we try to
decide exactly what we will do in behalf ofthe cared-for. If I am ill-informed, or if I
make a mistake, or if I act impetuously, I may hurt rather than help the cared-for"
[85]. Clearly, both modes are required to act in the best interest ofthe patient. What
is crucial is that the physician be capable ofattaining both modes. "Hence, in caring,
my rational powers are not diminished but they are enrolled in the service of my
engrossment in the other" [85]. Aphysicianwho careswill place agreat deal ofvalue
on medical knowledge and skill. As stated earlier, technical skills are put to use in
achieving the goods internal to a practice. There are, however, two aspects to being
informed-one is technical knowledge, the other is knowledge ofthe patient.
Natural versus Ethical Caring
To understand the ethic ofcaring, certain concepts mustbe understood. Noddings
distinguishes natural caring-for example, parent for child, friend for friend, lover
for lover-from ethical caring. Ethical caring is the relation inwhich the other is met
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morally, and it is a reflection of natural caring, the relation in which caring is a
response to love or natural inclination. Noddings states that natural caring is " . . .
the human condition that we, consciously or unconsciously, perceive as 'good' " [85].
When we care ethically, we are attempting to emulate a state of natural caring
toward which we "long and strive". " . . . it is our longing for caring- to be in that
special relation-that provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be
moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal ofourselves
as one-caring" [85].
Noddings uses the image of concentric circles sending forth chains with ourselves
at the center. Closest to us are our most intimate cared-fors, those for whom we
naturally care.
As we move outward in the circles, we encounter those for whom we have
personal regard. Here, as in the more intimate circles, we are guided in what
we do by at least three considerations: how we feel, what the other expects of
us, and what the situational relationship requires of us. Persons in these
circles do not, in the usual course ofevents, require from uswhat our families
naturally demand, and the situations inwhichwe find ourselves have, usually,
their own rules ofconduct [85].
It is in these circles that physicians encounter their patients. Farther out still are
others not yet encountered but linked to current patients by "chains of caring."
Noddings says, "The construction of such formal chains places us in a state of
readiness to care" [85].
In other words, these patients farther out are the potentially cared-for. The
physician isprepared to care forthese patients; theyshare the same potential as those
now cared-for. The same opportunity for the physician to be fulfilled as physician
exists in relationship to these unknown others. Butwhat ifthe physician does not feel
like caring for one or more ofthese yet-to-come-closer patients? Is this not the same
question asked all along?
In Noddings's language, in questioning whether to care for these others, the
physician is questioning the "I must," the moral imperative ofethical caring. "I may
recognize the internal 'I must,' that natural imperative that arises as I receive the
other. . . " [85]. When the "I must" is indistinguishable from the "I want," as it often
is with natural caring, there is no difficult decision to make. But when there is a
conflict, aswith caringforpatientswithAIDS, the physician maywant toreject the "I
must." Noddings states, "I may reject it instantaneously by shifting from 'I must do
something' to 'something must be done,' and removing myself from the set of
possible agents through whom the action should be accomplished" [85]. The
statements discussed earlier put out by the AMA and other professional organiza-
tions regarding the physician's obligation to care for patients with AIDS allow
physicians to reject the "I must" in this exact manner.
TheEthicalIdealand theEthical Self
The answer for which we search may finally be had by examining the concepts of
the ethical ideal and the ethical self. Noddings explains,
... Iam closest togoodness when Iacceptandaffirm the intemal "Imust. " Now
it is certainly true that the "I must" can be rejected and, ofcourse, it can grow
quieter under the stress ofliving. I can talk myselfout ofthe "I must," detach
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myself from feeling and try to think my way to an ethical life. But this isjust
what I must not do ifI value my ethical self(emphasisadded) [85].
This picture ofoneself "closest to goodness" in caring relationship, therefore, is the
ethical ideal.
The ethical self is the physician as the physician wants to be, the responsible,
caring healer, the teacher, the one bound to patients, the one who strives to come as
close as possible to the ethical ideal. Recall that the essence of the practice of
medicine is relationship, that relationship is fundamental to being a physician. The
ethical self is discovered in relationship and is dependent on relationship, and the
story ofthe ethical physician is a story ofrelationship.
Noddings says, "The ethical selfis an active relation between my actual self and a
vision of my ideal self as one-caring and cared-for. It is born of the fundamental
recognition ofrelatedness: thatwhich connects me naturally to the other, reconnects
me through the other to myself' [85]. Hear again the wordsofCassell, " . . . ourvery
existence is defined by our relationships-our connection to life itself' [73]. In
knowing and caring for the patient, the physician knows and cares for himself or
herself as physician. Noddings states," .... caring for my ethical selfcommits me to
struggle toward the otherthrough clouds ofdoubt, aversion, and apathy" [85].
AnAnswer
Here then is the question asked and an answer. Arephysiciansobligated to answer
the "I must" and care for patients with AIDS? Yes, resoundingly yes. Physicians
reject the "I must" at great peril. The individual physician's response affects him or
her as a caring, responsible physician; it affects the story he or she will have to tell; it
affects his or her ability to achieve the internal goods of medicine, including
self-realization; and, therefore, it affects the practice ofmedicine.
A decision to reject or accept the "I must" is a decision for which the physician is
held accountable. MacIntyre says, "To be the subject of a narrative that runs from
one's birth to one's death is ... to be accountable for the actions and experiences
which compose a narratable life" [71]. Accountability requires something more than
declaring, as did Drs. Schmahl and Wilbur, that, "I did my time," or "I've got to be
selfish." Really caring about the self means caring about the ethical self. Noddings
states, "We are not 'justified'-we areobligated-to do what is required to maintain
and enhance caring. We must 'justify' not-caring; that is, we must explainwhy, in the
interest ofcaring for ourselves as ethical selves or in the interest ofothers forwhom
we care, we maybehave asones-not-caring toward this particularother" [85].
There is choice here, but it is not the free enterprise ideal of free choice as to
whom to serve. It is choice about the physician's ethical self, about the physician's
story, about "whom to be . .. -or, more accurately, whom to become" [87], about
the strands of thread that will be woven into the tapestry ofthe practice ofmedicine.
Chekhov's Dr. Astrov has a revelation when a patient on whom he has worked
without feeling or compassion dies. He realizes that the course he chooses today
becomes the legacy of physicians tomorrow. "And just when I didn't need any
feelings, my feelings woke up, my conscience was stricken, as if I had killed him
deliberately... I sat down, closed my eyes-like this-and I thought; those who will
live one or two hundred years after us, and those we blaze the trail for now, will they
remember uswith a kind word?" [88].
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The moral nature of the physician-patient relationship demands that the physician
accept moral responsibility. Certainly the physician must accept moral responsibility
for the care ofpatients with whom he or she is already in relationship, but this moral
responsibility extends also to future patients, including those with AIDS. Not to
extend responsibility in this way diminishes the physician's ethical ideal, a vision of
the physician as good physician, which has consequences for the physician's capacity
to care and therefore for the practice of medicine.
Until now, with few exceptions, physicians, lawyers, and ethicists have examined
the ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS in terms of only one orientation
to morality, that which emerges naturally from the concept of self in relation to
others based on separation and objectivity. This is a morality defined in rules and
standards offairness [82,83,89]. Searching for obligation in this manner leads to laws
and codes and principles of ethical conduct and the absence of any unambivalent,
straightforward statement ofobligation.
There are, however, glimpses ofthreads of a different, care-based morality as they
have been found within the tradition of medicine and have been woven into the
unfinished tapestry of the practice of medicine. These threads come together most
obviously in the 1988 joint statement of the American College of Physicians and The
Infectious Diseases Society ofAmerica referred to earlier. It states, in part,
If medicine wishes to retain its respected status as the healing profession, we
must continue to provide the best possible care to our patients, regardless of
personal risk. To do less threatens the very nature of the patient-physician
relationship, makes a mockery ofourprofessional heritage, and violates the very
essence ofbeingaphysician (emphasis added)[60].
It is now clear that the essence, the fundamental construct, ofbeing a physician, of
participating in the practice of medicine, is relationship. Only in examining the
ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS in terms of the orientation to
morality that emerges naturally from connection and is defined in caring can that
obligation be known. It is the nature of the physician-patient relationship that is
threatened when that essence is violated, and it is the practice as well as the
individual practitioners that feel the effects of that violation. After all the searching,
the ethical obligation does, in fact, exist within the practice ofmedicine.
The Ethos ofRelationality
Why is it that the ethic of caring is not as clearly outspoken or as forcefully and
primarily called to the forefront in the practice of medicine as is the ethic of rights?
Why do physicians not automatically turn to an ethos of relationality, "the capacity
or potential to experience other persons" [81], to affirm their obligation to patients?
Certainly this ethos has its place in the tradition of the practice of medicine. It is
there in the words ofthe framers of the 1847 AMA Code of Medical Ethics who said,
"A physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his mind
ought also to be imbued with ... the responsibility he habitually incurs ..." [50]. It is
called to mind by the nineteenth-century physician Worthington Hooker, who said,
He enters the dwelling ofthe sick as if he were one ofthe family, and the very
office that he is to perform disarms all formality, and pre-supposes inter-
course of the most familiar character. The patient is to speak to him not of a
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foreign subject, nor of some one else, but of himself, of his own body, of its
pains and ailments, and that too with sufficient minuteness to communicate
an adequate knowledge ofhis case. In doing so, he calls into exercise not only
the scientific acumen ofthephysician, but mingled with this, the sympathy of
the confidentialfriend [90].
This ethos is there in the writing of Peabody in 1927, who said, "The practice of
medicine in its broadest sense includes the whole relationship of the physician with
his patient" [84]. It is there in the everyday thoughts and deeds of hundreds of
physicians who are dedicated to caring for their patients. It is there in the writings of
modern medical ethicists, May [66], Cassell [73], Pellegrino [91], Ladd [69,72], and
Kass, who says,
The call for rules, guidelines, and procedures; the convening of ethics
committees; and the encouragement ofstatutory regulations are a search for
yet one more technical solution-this time a technical ethical solution-for
problems produced by our already foolish tendency to see technical medical
solutions for the weighty difficulties of human life. If a doctor would be a
physician and not merely abodytechnician, he must alsobe aknowerofsouls,
those ofhis patients and, not least, his own [65].
This ethos is not that of the hospital, however, the institution where medical
students and beginning physicians are trained and socialized.
Institutional Socialization
In 1927, Peabody asked the question, "Can you form a personal relationship in an
impersonal institution?" [84]. As stated earlier, an institution, as opposed to a
practice, is primarily interested in the acquisition and distribution ofexternal goods.
A physician's investment in a patient is different from a hospital's investment in a
patient. The hospital, while it isconcerned with the patientgettingwell, is concerned
notwith the patient's illness, butwith the patient's disease, in the sense elucidated by
Cassell. The hospital is concerned with time and efficiency and how these relate to
cutting costs. This is not at all to say that physicians should not be concerned with
cutting costs because, of course, they should be. Caring for the patient demands a
sense ofresponsibility in regard to the patient'sfinances, but a sense ofresponsibility
in regard to society is also demanded. Physicians cannot, however, be motivated
primarily by concerns for efficiency and cost at the expense ofcare.
Maybelieves that physicians' training emphasizes the technical skills aspect ofthe
practice of medicine over that of relationship and caring. In the hospital, "The
patient functions as locale for the disease-like a farmhouse on a battleground that
acquires interest for the soldier only because of the enemy that may inhabit it. The
cumulative impact of the training filters out the personal, not merely the patient as
person but the physician asperson" [66]. Simenon's Maugras lying in his hospital bed
wonders, "Wouldn't the ideal thing, for some doctors, be sickness without any sick
men?" [74]. This depersonalization ofboth patient and physician is a consequence of
the pressures applied to the physician by the institutional setting emphasizing and
rewarding institutional values.
Mizrahi explores the process of socialization ofbeginning doctors that she says is
responsible for the forging of a professional consciousness steeped in the attitude
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that it is desirable to "get rid of patients (GROP)" [92]. This consciousness is
diametrically opposed to the fundamental construct of the practice of medicine,
which has been identified as relationship. It leads to the characterization ofpatients
as"gomers," "hits," "trainwrecks," and "dirtballs."
Mizrahi studied the house staff in the department of internal medicine in a large
southern university medical center during the late 1970s and early 1980s. There she
found that beginning physicians, tired, frustrated, and overwhelmed, instead of
bonding with patients, tended to bond with and desire the approval of other house
staff members who already were socialized in the GROP perspective. Within this
perspective, the patient was characterized as "the ultimate enemy" [92]. In his
discouraging account of the process ofbecoming a physician, Konner concurs. "It is
obvious from what I have written here that the stress ofclinical training alienates the
doctor from the patient, that in a real sense the patient becomes the enemy" [93].
Konner goes so far as to suggest that meeting the demands of institutional medicine
requires more than objectivity and detachment from the patient, it"... may actually
require a measure ofdislike" [93].
In Mizrahi's study, the approval of the peer group was bestowed not on those
members of the house staff who cared but those who could "turf," "dump," or in
other ways work efficiently to reduce the patient load. Mizrahi found that there are
many strategies employed by house staff to get rid of patients or to distance
themselves. One is avoidance. Interacting directly with patients was given relatively
short shrift in a day filled with making phone calls, scheduling appointments, writing
notes, filling out forms, transporting patients, preparing for, conducting, or following
up on rounds.
Another strategy is objectification, whereby the patient is treated as a non-person.
Noddings says that treating people as "types" instead of persons turns them into
"cases." "The fact is that many of us have been reduced to cases by the very
machinery that hasbeen instituted to care for us" [85]. Simenon's Maugras is treated
thisway. "Glanceswere exchanged, as at the start ofhis illness. Ofcourse, he was not
in on the secret. What was happening had nothing to do with him, even if it was
happening to him, in his own body" [74]. Mizrahi finds that, "Treating patients as
absent when they are physically present denies the existence of the human subject.
By treating most patients as subjectless objects, the house staff eliminated them as
active participants in patient care in spite of increasing data on the importance of
patient involvement" [92]. It was more likely that patients treated in this manner
were from social groups or had diseases that house staff found objectionable. It is a
mode ofbehavior easily accessible to physicians caring for patients with AIDS.
Mizrahi found other barriers to establishing physician-patient relationships. The
house staff" . .. learned that to spend extensive time engaged in the doctor-patient
relationship went unrewarded and indeed might even lead to sanctions from their
mentors if activities more important in the latter's eyes were ignored or postponed"
[92]. One activity that was often given less attention as the house staff progressed
through their training was history taking-hearing the patient's story. A resident
remarked, "Ifyou don't sit and talkwith the cancer patient for a half hour, in terms
ofyourjob description andwhat's expected, nobodywill be upsetwithyou. But ifyou
don't know what the hemoglobin is on that patient, they ... are going to be very
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upset" [92]. The frequent change in assignment to services to allow for greatest
exposure to awide variety ofpatients creates another inadvertent barrier.
In addition, house staff complained that they infrequently observed more than
"fleeting" interaction between attendings and patients, and " . . . when humanistic
behaviorwas manifested by a few attending physicians, it was perceived as either the
exception to the rule or an artifact of the attendings' privileged removal from
everyday patient care" [92]. Beginning physicians can be denied much access to
established physicians who find strength and gratification in the physician-patient
relationship. Furthermore, this denial may directly influence the attitudes a new
physician may develop toward patients with AIDS. Cooke and Sande state, "Many
trainees, working in settings inwhich no one can articulate the complexmedical ethic
and where prestigious faculty members see fewpatients, are deprived ofthe example
ofpractitioners resolving the tensions between perceived personal risk and potential
benefit to the patient" [94]. They emphasize the powerful positive impact of
exposure to " . . . the clinician-teacher providing hands-on AIDS care" [94].
Ultimately, the house staff followed in Mizrahi's study made career decisions
based on their needs and in relation to the experiences they had while serving as
house staff. Interestingly, all the house staff felt that their relationships with their
peers were the most important during their training years. It is little wonder that
many physicians consider their allegiance to co-professionals a solemn commitment.
That relationship, at least, is well developed by the end of the training years.
Relationships with patients were held in different regard. Mizrahi found,
Career choices are often a reaction against the conditions experienced in the
training context. Doctors have learned to view patients most benignly as
boring and intrusive, at worst, as candidates for avoidance. At the end of
training, doctors desire to recapture what remains of a personal life, acquire
the social status and concomitant social privilege that is the reward for their
service and sacrifice, control the conditions oftheir labor, and regulate their
relationships with patients, for in their training, patients have come to
embody a recalcitrant and exploitive system [92].
It is sad and unfortunate that beginning physicians in "boot camp" medical
training are denied much of a view of the essence of medicine, the one thing that
could positively sustain them as they make it through the trials of those years.
Patients are everywhere around them. Instead of circling the wagon trains to keep
the enemy out, beginning physicians need to draw the circle larger, to encompass
patients as those cared-for and to come to know themselves as ones-caring. In this
way, physicians can, through caring, responsible relationship, acquire the internal
goods of the practice ofmedicine, one ofwhich is self-realization, instead oflonging
only for the external goods ofstatus, privilege, and income.
A step in this direction will be taken when the validity of the ethic ofcaring in the
practice of medicine is recognized; when the ethos of relationality found within the
tradition ofthe practice ofmedicine is heralded and made an integral part ofmedical
student and house staff training; and when those responsible for the training ofnew
physicians take seriously the destructive domination ofinstitutional values over those
of the practice of medicine. Then the motivational stories told about the "good"
house staff, the lore of the hospital, can become stories of receptivity of patients
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rather than avoidance. Then the ethical ideal born in stories of relationship will be
nurtured in stories ofthe institution.
Rejection ofthe "IMust"
For a moment, let us return to the concept ofthe ethical selfand how it is enlarged
and enhanced through attention to the "I must." The obligation to care for patients
with AIDS has been affirmed in the moral responsibility that stems from the caring
relationship ofphysician forpatient; however, one point hasyet to be addressed. Is it
always morally wrong to reject the "I must"? Can there ever be extenuating
circumstances that would require one to say, "I cannot care for this patient with
AIDS"? Indeed, might there not be a conflict between one's relationship with
patients and one's relationship with the more intimate cared-fors in a closer circle,
for example, one's family? One can certainlybe part ofmore than one practice.
The Massachusetts licensing regulations stipulate that one possible exception to
the duty to care for patients with AIDS might be in the case of a pregnant physician
treating a patient with cytomegalovirus. Many newborn intensive care units recog-
nize this exception and post signswarning pregnant caregivers in caseswhere a baby
is known to be shedding cytomegalovirus. In such a case, a pregnant caregiver may
have to excuse herself from performing certain procedures that might place the
unborn fetus at increased risk.
Another example of a situation exempting a physician from caring for a patient
with AIDS would be in the case of a physician without immunity to varicella zoster
viruswho is assigned to care for an HIV-positive patientwith herpeszoster. In such a
case, a physician could become an unwitting carrier of chicken pox. An infectious
physician maybe a threat to other immunocompromised patients or to immunocom-
promised family members and friends.
A decision such as this physician's is based on facts available to him or her at a
particular instant in time. The decision not to care for aparticularpatientwithAIDS
who is known to have herpes zoster does not mean that he or she will not care for all
patientswith AIDS, and it does not mean that he or she will not care for this patient
under different circumstances; it is subject to change with a change in facts. Then,
enhancement of the ethical selfwill require a different response. Under all circum-
stances, the decision is grounded in caring relationship. Deciding to reject the "I
must" in this way is altogether different from a blanket refusal to care for patients
with AIDS out offear that to do so may somehow threaten one's family.
In an ethic ofcaring and responsibility, only the one-caring can decide responsibly
what actionwill enhance andwhat actionwill diminish the ethical self. It isimportant
to remember that the ethical ideal is not a rule or regulation that can be invoked.
According to Noddings, "The one-caring, clearly, applies 'right' and 'wrong' most
confidently to her own decisions. This does not ... make her a relativist. The caring
attitude that lies at the heart ofall ethical behavior is universal" [85].
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is an ethical obligation to care for patients with AIDS. It is
grounded in the potent essence of the practice ofmedicine, in the physician-patient
relationship. This is a caring relationship wherein the physician comes to know the
patient through attention to the patient's story and body. This relationship carries
with it responsibility to act always with concern for the well-being of the patient.
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Furthermore, this responsibility extends to those patients yet to come, those with
whom there is the potential for relationship. The imperative to care for these others
rests on a vision of the self as an ethical one-caring created, enhanced, and realized
in relationship, diminished and violated in rejection of relationship, and held
accountable in the story ofoneselfas physician.
The unfinished tapestry ofthe story of the practice ofmedicine depends on these
threads ofphysicians' stories to be woven into its rich tradition. Then physicians will
be able, as Arras explains, to
... proceed to tell a story, to relate a history, of a profession that has
incorporated a willingness to take risks for the benefit of patients as a
constitutive element in physicians' self-understanding. Over time, this ac-
countwould explain, theprofession elevated the ideal ofsteadfast devotion to
the well being of patients to the status of a fundamental duty, a definitive
element inherent in the very role of physician. According to this story,
physicians, if queried about their commitment to accept risk in the line of
duty, would simply respond, "This is who we are; this is what we do . . ." [48].
As Arras points out, "Incredibly, however, this is a history that hasyet to bewritten"
[48].
It is up to this generation of physicians to acclaim an ethos of relationality,
standing shoulder to shoulder with past and future generations ofphysicians. It is up
to this generation of physicians to acknowledge the value of relationship in the
practice ofmedicine, to fight for its preeminence in the education ofnew physicians,
and tobe sure that it isrelationship that isaffirmed in tradition. Finally, it isup to this
generation ofphysicians, inspired by the challenge ofAIDS, to articulate clearly its
commitment so that future generations will come to the practice knowing without
confusionwhat Dr. Rieux in ThePlague knew:
. . . that the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be
only the record ofwhat had had tobe done, and what assuredlywould have to
be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless
onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all who, while unable to be
saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be
healers [70].
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